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and the other which demands the truth from a witness. 2 A "cautious
balancing" is necessary. For Burger and the majority of this Court, the
second objective is more important to the administration of justice. The
Court reasons that if a prior statement of the defendant cannot be used
against him for impeachment or as evidence, there is more of a tendency
on the part of the defendant to perjure himself by contradicting his prior
statement with his in-court testimony. On the other hand, the majority of
the impeachment cases, the majority in Miranda, and the dissent in
Harris would give the first objective-that of prohibiting the use of
illegally obtained evidence-a definite priority.
The result in this case cannot be considered surprising in view of the
change in the composition of the Court. Justices Harlan, Stewart and
White were in the dissent in Miranda. Chief Justice Burger was the dis-
trict court judge in Johnson v. United States' which permitted the use of
an "improperly" obtained confession for impeachment purposes, and he
also wrote the opinion in Tate v. United States, exemplifying the same
view. With the instant decision the Court is in effect undercutting both
Miranda's attempt to supply adequate safeguards to keep the fifth amend-
ment self-incrimination clause intact and to more effectively "police the
police" and the Weeks exclusionary rule which Walder does not claim to
have overruled.
The Court is in essence adopting the position of a minority of states
by holding that impeachment by means of illegally obtained evidence is
permissible. However, the Court makes no mention of these cases, relying
instead on the cases which have eroded the exclusionary rule of Weeks. In
this author's opinion, the Court by so doing, ignores a possibly more valid
method-that of following an established line of cases-which it could
have used to arrive at its desired result.
JAN NOVACK
THIRTY DOLLARS OR THIRTY DAYS: EQUAL PROTECTION
FOR INDIGENTS
Two defendants, convicted of arson, were granted probation on the
condition that each pay a fine of $2500 plus a penalty assessment of $625,
or in lieu of payment, serve one day in the county jail for each $10 un-
paid. This procedure was authorized by statute.i One defendant paid
and was summarily released from custody. The other defendant, Antazo,
was an indigent and therefore began serving his default sentence. While
incarcerated, he petitioned the California Supreme Court for a writ of
32. Tate v. United States, 283 F.2d 377 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
33. 344 F.2d 163 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
1. CAL. PZAi. CODE § 1205 (Deering 1960).
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habeas corpus. The court, recognizing that habeas corpus would lie in
special circumstances even though a remedy by appeal might be available,
held: Ordering a convicted indigent to serve out a fine and penalty at a
specified rate per day because of his inability to pay constitutes an in-
vidious discrimination on the basis of wealth in violation of the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.2 In re Antazo, 3 Cal. 3d
100, 473 P.2d 999, 89 Cal. Rptr. 255 (1970).
Imprisonment for default originated in thirteenth century England.'
In the United States, such practice is generally authorized by statute, and
the Supreme Court has upheld such statutes.4 Over the years convicted
indigents have sought relief through constitutional provisions, the most
significant of which are the eighth amendment,5 the thirteenth amend-
ment6 and the "equal protection" clause of the fourteenth amendment.7
The eighth amendment has offered the indigent defendant little hope as a
defense. When a sentence includes a fine, most authorities reject the asser-
tion that imprisonment for nonpayment constitutes "cruel and unusual"
punishment.8 This is especially true when the period of confinement is
within the statutory maximum for the substantive offense.9 Generally, the
courts have refused to consider a defendant's ability to pay in determining
whether "cruel or unusual" punishment was involved.10 The eighth amend-
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, provides that:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No
state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdic-
tion the equal protection of the laws.
3. E. SUTHERLAND & D. CRESsEY, CRndINoLoGY 275 (6th ed. 1960).
4. Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970); Hill v. United States ex rel. Wampler, 298
U.S. 460 (1936) ; Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII which states
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and un-
usual punishments inflicted.
6. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1, which states
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof
the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any
place subject to their jurisdiction.
7. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
8. Board of Health v. Elmwood Terrace, Inc., 85 N.J. Super. 240, 204 A.2d 379 (1964);
People ex rel. Crockett v. Redman, 41 Misc. 2d 962, 246 N.Y.S.2d 861 (Sup. Ct. Erie Cty.
1964) ; Adjmi v. State, 139 So.2d 179 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962) ; Lee v. State, 103 Ga. App. 161,
118 S.E.2d 599 (1961); Ex parte Carr, 365 P.2d 392 (Okla. Crim. 1961) ; People v. Magoni,
73 Cal. App. 78, 238 P. 112 (1925) ; Foertsch v. Jameson, 48 S.D. 328, 204 N.W. 175 (1925) ;
State v. Tullock, 118 Wash. 496, 203 P. 932 (1922) ; Ex parte Converse, 45 Nev. 93, 198 P.
229 (1921) ; Berkenfield v. People, 191 Il1. 272, 61 N.E. 96 (1901) ; State v. Peterson, 38 Minn.
143, 36 N.W. 443 (1888).
9. Smith v. United States, 273 F.2d 462 (10th Cir. 1959) ; Hadley v. State, 196 Ark. 307,
117 S.W.2d 352 (1938); Brown v. State, 152 Fla. 853, 13 So.2d 458 (1943); Lawrence v.
State, 2 Md. App. 736, 237 A.2d 81 (1968) ; State v. Bethea, 272 N.C. 521, 158 S.E.2d 591
(1968) ; State v. Kimbrough, 212 S.C. 348, 46 S.E.2d 273 (1948) ; State v. Pratt, 36 Wis. 2d
312, 153 N.W.2d 18 (1967).
10. Ex parte Watkins, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 568 (1833); Burlington C.R.& N. Ry. Co. v.
Dey, 82 Iowa 312, 48 N.W. 98 (1891); Foertsch v. Jameson, 48 S.D. 328, 204 N.W. 175
(1925). But see Ex parte Tuicher, 69 Iowa 393, 28 N,W. 655 (1886).
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ment sanctions were only recently made mandatory upon the states," and
as yet have not been used as a valid defense to such imprisonment.'
The thirteenth amendment has also failed to provide assistance to
the defendant who is without funds. The weight of authority holds that it
is not "involuntary servitude" to put a defendant in jail in default of pay-
ment of a fine.13
The most successful avenue of attack on default sentencing appears
to be through the "equal protection" clause of the fourteenth amendment.
The aegis of this clause has been specifically extended to indigents in a
barrage of recent decisions. 4 The United States Supreme Court set the
trend by recognizing that "[t]here can be no equal justice where the
kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has."' 5 In
Williams v. Illinois, 6 a convicted indigent was fined and given the maxi-
mum prison term allowed for the substantive violation. Should there be a
default of payment of the fine, the defendant was to satisfy it by an addi-
tional period of incarceration at a specified daily rate. The Court, relying
upon the "equal protection" clause, held that default sentencing could
not be applied if the effect would be to extend the length of confinement
beyond the statutory substantive limit.' 7 In Williams, the Court impliedly
gave reluctant approval to the practice of default sentencing of indigents
under certain conditions.
The "equal protection" safeguards are finally finding limited expres-
sion in state court decisions involving default sentencing of indigents.
Traditionally, lower courts have approved of incarceration for nonpayment
11. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). State court decisions prior to this fre-
quently relied upon state constitutions in deciding whether the provisions against "cruel and
unusual" punishment were violated.
12. See State v. Hampton, 209 So.2d 899 (Miss. 1968); People v. Collins, 47 Misc. 2d
210, 261 N.Y.S.2d 970 (Orange Cty. Ct. 1965). But see People v. McMillan, 53 Misc. 2d 685,
279 N.Y.S.2d 941 (Orange Cty. Ct. 1967), where the court ordered the release of a prisoner
confined to serve out a fine at $1 per day, saying that the formula used to equate the fine
and punishment was excessive by today's economic standards.
13. Goode v. Nelson, 73 Fla. 29, 74 So. 17 (1917); City of Chicago v. Kunowski, 308
Ill. 206, 139 N.E. 28 (1923) ; City of Topeka v. Boutwell, 53 Kan. 20, 35 P. 819 (1894) ; State
v. McGuire, 152 La. 953, 94 So. 896 (1922) ; Ex parte Hollman, 79 S.C. 9, 60 S.E. 19 (1908) ;
City of Milwaukee v. Horvath, 31 Wis. 2d 490, 143 N.W.2d 446 (1966). But cf. Anderson
v. Ellington, 300 F. Supp. 789 (M.D. Tenn. 1969); Wright v. Matthews, 209 Va. 246, 163
S.E.2d 158 (1968), where it was held that default sentencing to work off the costs of pros-
ecution contravened the thirteenth amendment since costs are not part of the punishment.
14. Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970); Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40 (1967);
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) ; Entsminger v. Iowa, 386 U.S. 748 (1967); Long
v. District Court, 385 U.S. 192 (1966) ; Rinadi v. Yaeger, 384 U.S. 305 (1966) ; Draper v.
Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963) ; Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963) ; Douglas v. Califor-
nia, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) ; Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961) ; Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S.
252 (1959) ; Eskridge v. Washington State Bd. of Prison Terms, 357 U.S. 214 (1958) ; Griffin
v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
15. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956).
16. 399 U.S. 235 (1970).
17. The holding was specifically restricted to the situation where incarceration for non-
payment of the fine would result in imprisonment for a term longer than that authorized
by statute for violation of the substantive law.
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of a fine. 8 However, where the court is faced with an indigent defendant
who could possibly be incarcerated beyond the statutory maximum, recent
decisions have afforded the indigent relief through the fourteenth amend-
ment "equal protection" clause."9
The "equal protection" clause does not require that a state statute
apply with absolute and complete equality to all persons.20 It does allow
a state to differentiate in its treatment so long as the result does not
amount to an invidious discrimination.2 In California, the test used to
determine whether the discrimination is invidious is whether there is a
compelling state interest which justifies the law and whether the distinc-
tions drawn by such law are necessary to implement this interest.22
In Antazo, the court recognized that the state had a compelling and
legitimate interest in collecting fines, but found that this interest was not
promoted by conditioning probation upon payment of the assessed fine23
and declared the statute24 invalid as applied.23 However, in granting a writ
of habeas corpus, the court did not totally relieve Antazo of obligation
which might be owing by virtue of his probation order.26
18. Callahan v. United States, 371 F.2d 658 (9th Cir. 1967); Panno v. United States,
203 F.2d 504 (9th Cir. 1953) ; United States v. Jenkins, 141 F. Supp. 499 (S.D. Ga. 1956) ;
State v. Hansen, 67 Idaho 359, 181 P.2d 192 (1947) ; State v. Gray, 225 La. 38, 72 So.2d 3
(1954) ; Moulden v. State, 217 Md. 351, 142 A.2d 595 (1958) ; State v. Hampton, 209 So.2d
899 (Miss. 1968); State v. Johnson, 432 S.W.2d 284 (Mo. 1968); People v. Watson, 204
Misc. 467, 126 N.Y.S.2d 832 (Ct. of Gen. Sess. N.Y. Cty. 1953); Ex parte Carr, 365 P.2d
392 (Okla. Crim. 1961); Foust v. Ford, 209 S.W.2d 941 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948). Accord
United States v. Buchanan, 195 F. Supp. 713 (E.D. Ky. 1961); Hankins v. United States,
120 A.2d 590 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1956); In re Benedict, 142 Ohio St. 632, 53 N.E.2d
646 (1944).
19. Arthur v. Schoonfield, 315 F. Supp. 548 (D. Md. 1970); Lucas v. United States,
268 A.2d 524 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Sawyer v. District of Columbia, 238 A.2d 314 (D.C. Cir.
1968); People v. Mackey, 18 N.Y.2d 755, 221 N.E.2d 462, 274 N.Y.S.2d 682 (1966); People
v. Saffore, 18 N.Y.S.2d 101, 218 N.E.2d 686, 271 N.Y.S.2d 972 (1966); People v. Collins, 47
Misc.2d 210, 261 N.Y.S.2d 970 (Orange Cty. Ct. 1965) ; Strattman v. Studt, 20 Ohio St. 2d
95, 253 N.E.2d 749 (1969). Accord Spinler v. State, 152 Mont. 69, 446 P.2d 429 (1968).
Cf. Dillehay v. White, 264 F. Supp. 164 (M.D. Tenn. 1966); In re Cole, 17 Ohio App. 2d
207, 245 N.E.2d 384 (1968). But see Wade v. Carsley, 221 So.2d 725 (Miss. 1969).
20. Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305 (1966); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
21. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
22. Castro v. State, 2 Cal. 3d 223, 466 P.2d 244, 85 Cal. Rptr. 20 (1970).
23. Actually the respondent, Sheriff of Santa Clara County, argued that the default sen-
tence could be substantiated on two grounds: 1.) as a method of enforcing payment and
2.) as "relating to rehabilitation." The Court summarily discarded the respondent's second
reason as untenable. The first ground was attacked by a dual approach. First, the court could
not envision how imprisonment could force a man to pay when he was without funds. Sec-
ond, even if it could be assumed that such imprisonment serves the state's collection mech-
anism it is not necessary in a Constitutional sense.
24. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1205 (Deering 1960).
25. A statute can be discriminatory on its face, Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S.
483 (1954); or as applied, Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954); Fowler v. Rhode
Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
26. The Court, without elucidating, made reference to modes of collecting fines as an
alternative to confinement. 3 Cal. 3d at 117, 473 P.2d at 1010, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 266.
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Prior to 1971, default sentencing in Florida was provided for by
statute. 7 Florida courts had consistently permitted such sentencing" as
long as the statutory maximum was not exceeded.2 State constitutional
provisions ° prohibiting "excessive fines" or "cruel and unusual punish-
ment" have not been successfully employed when the total period of con-
finement does not extend beyond the limit authorized by statute for
conviction of the substantive offense.8 ' Even when default sentencing is
involved,8 2 the prohibition against "imprisonment for debt" 3 is not ap-
plicable to criminal fines.84
Since the legislature has copiously provided for the indigent de-
fendant, it is doubtful that Florida courts would at this time be inclined
to extend the Williams8" interpretation of "equal protection" to the inter-
pretation given by the court in Antazo. Statutes permit, under certain
circumstances, the abatement of costs, 8 credit for time served, 7 and the
27. FLA. STAT. § 921.14 (1969) repealed, Laws of Florida § 180, Ch. 70-339 (1970), pro-
vided as follows:
Whenever a court shall sentence and adjudge a person to pay a fine or a fine and
costs of prosecution such court shall also provide in such sentence a period of time
for which such person shall be imprisoned in default of the payment of the same.
Such term of imprisonment shall be served in the county jail if the offense for
which sentence is imposed is a misdemeanor and in either the state prison or the
county jail if the offense for which the sentence is imposed is a felony, and the
sentence shall specify where such term is to be served.
However, the following statute remains in force: FrA. STAT. § 56.011 (1969).
[Nior shall the body of any defendant be subject to arrest or confinement for the
payment of money, except it be for fines imposed by lawful authority.
28. Dixon v. Mayo, 64 So.2d 176 (Fla. 1953); Williams v. State, 158 Fla. 415, 28 So.2d
691 (1947) ; Ex parte Peacock, 25 Fla. 478, 6 So. 473 (1889).
29. Schreck v. State, 240 So.2d 873 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970) ; Gary v. State, 239 So.2d 523
(Fla. 4th Dist. 1970). Accord Lyle v. Walter, 100 Fla. 1457, 131 So. 383 (1930) ; Ex parte
Brandamour, 91 Fla. 889, 108 So. 895 (1926).
30. FLA. CONST. DECL. OF RIGHTS § 17.
Excessive fines, cruel or unusual punishment, attainder, forfeiture of estate, indefinite
imprisonment, and unreasonable detention of witnesses are forbidden.
31. La Barbera v. State, 63 So.2d 654 (Fla. 1953).
32. Brown v. State, 152 Fla. 853, 13 So.2d 458 (1943).
33. FLA. CONST. DECL. oF RIGHTS § 11 provides that "[N]o person shall be imprisoned
for debt, except in cases of fraud."
34. Lanz v. Dowling, 92 Fla. 848, 850, 110 So. 522, 525 (1926) held that:
[T]he authorities are unanimous in holding that the debts intended to be covered
by such provisions [against imprisonment for debt] of the Constitution must be those
arising exclusively from actions ex contractu, and was never meant to include . . .
fines, penalties, and other impositions imposed by the courts in criminal proceeding
as punishments for crimes committed against the common or statute law.
See also Turner v. State ex rel. Gruver, 168 So.2d 192 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964) (garbage collection
fee held to be a "debt").
35. The Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, has already adopted Williams.
Schreck v. State, 240 So.2d 873 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970); Gary v. State, 239 So.2d 523 (Fla
4th Dist. 1970).
36. FLA. STAT. § 939.05 (1969).
In all cases less than capital, when it appears from due proof made in open court
that the person convicted is wholly unable to pay costs, and that the judgment has
in other respects been complied with, the court before which such person was con-
victed may discharge him without payment of costs.
37. FLA. STAT. § 951.15 (1969).
Every working prisoner shall be entitled to receive, together with subsistence, a credit
at the rate of thirty cents per diem, on account of fines and costs adjudged against
him.
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release of an incarcerated indigent.3 In Schreck v. State,"9 the court
recognized that imprisonment plus the levying of a fine was permissible"
when the statute in question4 ' provided for either imprisonment or a fine.
In light of Williams, the case was remanded to the trial court for "imposi-
tion of a proper sentence." The decision, in essence, presupposed that
default sentencing is constitutionally permissible.42 The Schreck case ap-
pears to represent the judicial and legislative climate in Florida at the
time of this writing.
In this author's opinion, Antazo could well be the harbinger of an-
other step to afford the indigent defendant the "equal protection" of the
laws.43 Incarceration is not the only means available for enforcing the
collection of fines. 44 Certainly the indigent should have the option to sat-
isfy the fine by an alternative method without automatically having to
default and go to jail.45
THOMAS TANSEY
38. FLA. STAT. § 922.04 (Supp. 1970).
When the court determines on the written application of a prisoner that he has been
imprisoned for sixty days solely for failure to pay a fine or costs which total not
more than three hundred dollars and that the prisoner is indigent and unable to pay
the fine or costs, the court shall order the prisoner discharged from custody.
See Ex parte Cutchen, 148 Fla. 345, 4 So.2d 373 (1941).
39. 240 So.2d 873 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
40. FLA. STAT. § 775.06 (1969).
[AInd whenever the punishment is prescribed to be a fine or imprisonment ... the
court may, in its discretion, proceed to punish by both fine and such imprisonment.
41. FiA. STAT. § 811.021(2) (1969), relating to grand larceny.
42. Of course the Williams doctrine must be followed.
43. While this article was being prepared for publication the Williams philosophy was
reiterated in Tate v. Short, 91 S. Ct. 668 (1971). In Tate the defendant, an indigent, was
convicted of several traffic offenses and sentenced to pay a fine. Texas law provided only for
a fine as the substantive sentence, although default sentencing was authorized if the fine was
not paid. The Court held that default sentencing could not be automatically imposed on in-
digents such that the statutory maximum for the substantive violations would be exceeded.
Such a procedure of sentencing would be a denial of equal protection. Since the statutory pro-
visions only provided for a fine in such cases, any jail time as a default sentence would exceed
the maximum sentence for the substantive violation. Tate did not preclude default sentencing
in principle. Such sentencing would be allowed under Tate for a defendant with the ability
to pay the fine but who refused to do so. Also an indigent who was offered an alternate
method of payment could be sentenced if collection of the fine still proved unsuccessful.
Because Tate relied on Williams for its holding it appears that a state could still auto-
matically sentence an indigent to serve out a fine so long as the maximum jail sentence pro-
vided by statute was not exceeded by the default sentence. Of course, in California Antazo
would prohibit this practice even though the statutory maximum was not surpassed by the
default sentence.
44. FLA. STAT. § 922.02 (Supp. 1970).
Execution on a sentence imposing a fine may be issued in the same manner as execu-
tion on a judgment in a civil action, whether or not the sentence also imposes
imprisonment.
45. One method that has been suggested is installment payments. This at least affords the
defendant an opportunity to pay the fine and avoid incarceration. See generally Note, The
Equal Protection Clause and Imprisonment of the Indigent for Nonpayment of Fines, 64
MIcEr. L. REv. 938 (1966); Note, Imprisonment for Nonpayment of Fines and Costs: A New
Look at the Law and the Constitution, 22 VAwn. L. Rav. 611 (1969).
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